Why Trump’s best friends in Europe will be more emboldened than ever…

It took quite some time for the mood to darken, even though the prospect of a victory for Donald Trump had already become clear. Overnight on Tuesday, the great and the good in Berlin had gathered for an event organised by the American Academy and Aspen Institute to watch the election.

In one of several presentations, pollsters from YouGov revealed the extent to which European voters had wanted Kamala Harris to win (the exception being Giorgia Meloni’s Italy). But it also showed that they had expected her to win, by an equally large margin. Based on what exactly? Hope springs eternal. The liberal disease. The European disease.

If anything good is to emanate from the return of Trump, it will be the shattering of European illusions. His decisive victory this time, including in vote share, removes any lingering doubt about the resilience of the global populist movement that he leads. It cannot be put down to a fluke, threats, media manipulation or Vladimir Putin – even if they all played a role at the margins.

And the effect on the political mainstream across Europe will be seismic.

Wherever you look, parties of the centre-left to centre-right are floundering. Mired in a series of crisis meetings, Germany’s bickering three-party coalition could collapse in the coming days. France is looking over its shoulder at Marine Le Pen, whose prospects for the next presidential elections are stronger than ever.

Spain’s Pedro Sanchez, struggling in a precarious administration, is furiously blamed for the terrible floods. Unlike his counterparts, Sir Keir Starmer is under no such immediate threat but the mood in the UK can hardly be described as cheerful.

Europe’s leaders have scrambled to congratulate Trump and to express their “ever closer friendship”. He will play them, as he wishes, sometimes smiling, other times snarling, seeing in these relations the opportunity for transactional gains. The object of the new president’s affections will be Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Italy’s Meloni, true believers and executors of his wishes on the European continent.

Orban has long been a subversive force inside the EU and Nato. As prime minister, Meloni has largely toed the line, particularly on support for Ukraine, in return for being given carte blanche to consolidate her power base at home with the usual populist strategy of undermining the independence of the media and judiciary, while pledging to clamp down on immigration (her Albania plan has been the object of intrigue rather than criticism). Now she will no longer feel constrained on any front.

Across Europe and beyond, populists on the far right and far left (and in the case of some, such as Germany’s ascendant Sahra Wagenknecht, combining the two) will be emboldened by Trump’s resounding success.

In office they will push their agendas harder and in opposition they will fight even more voraciously for power, using a similar playbook to Trump. Look for further gains for Le Pen’s National Rally (RN), for the Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD), for Wagenknecht’s BSW party and for Vox in Spain. In Poland, Donald Tusk already had the fight of his life to stave off a return of the far-right Peace and Justice party that used its most recent term in office to dismantle liberal freedoms.

The lesson Orban learnt was to use his time in opposition to further radicalise his programme for office. Trump has done the same. The 2016-era first wave of populism was often erratic and amateurish. Expect no such mistakes this time around.

As the extreme becomes the new mainstream, the old mainstream withers away, bereft of confidence and unclear what ground to occupy. On immigration, it is trying imitation. From Germany to Poland, radical restrictions are being imposed and Europe’s open borders are shutting fast.

Trump convinced a majority of Americans that Joe Biden had made them significantly worse off. It is true that many were feeling the squeeze, yet US growth was consistently above that of its European rivals (previously known as partners). A master communicator, Trump will ride on the coattails of a recovery and attribute that to his own hand.

Meanwhile, he will threaten China and all comers with tariffs that could range from an extraordinary 60 per cent to 10 or 20 per cent – no matter what level they are set, they will be painful. He will threaten, coerce and cajole. A divided and weak Europe will struggle to counter him and will bear the economic brunt.

Trump will almost certainly pull out of the Paris climate accords again but this time around, he may meet less resistance. No matter the devastation wrought by climate change, the green movement is now on the back foot.

The most important known unknown, to paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, is Ukraine. What exactly does Trump’s fabled “peace in a day” mantra mean? Across Europe, the word “peace” has been appropriated by the far right to mean doing Putin’s bidding.

But would America benefit from Russia extending its reach further into Europe, as it is doing successfully in Georgia and almost as successfully in Moldova? Is Trump content for North Korean soldiers to be fighting (and improving their training) on European soil? What message would that send to China? The answers to these questions will remain unclear until Trump suddenly decides.

Whatever he does, this is a time of grave danger. It’s also a potential opportunity for Europe to regroup. As Tusk said three days before the US elections, this should be the moment when “Europe finally grows up and believes in its own strength. Whatever the outcome, the era of geopolitical outsourcing is over.”

Will Europe do more to secure its own defence? Will it find its own distinctive voice and global strength? With the current generation of leaders, the chances of that happening are, sadly, extremely low. I, for one, will not be succumbing to wishful thinking.