If France and Germany don’t steady their ship, democracy may suffer

No working government; no budget; fractured politics; ailing economies; extremists knocking on the door. France and Germany are wallowing in shared misery and uncertainty as 2024 draws to a close.

The two supposed motors of the European Union are amid crises that have similar causes but are working themselves out in completely different ways.

Both countries are hamstrung just at a time when the challenges for the Western world have never been greater. The new era will begin in earnest with Donald Trump’s return to the White House on January 20. He will preside on the global stage as a role model for right-wing populism, encouraging states in Europe and beyond to enter his warm embrace.

The wider consequences for democracy are potentially catastrophic. If the French and Germans cannot restore credibility to their political systems relatively soon, they could serve as unwitting catalysts to the ultimate demise of mainstream democracy.

During Trump’s first term, the European model – Brexit Britain excepted – was seen as one of the last redoubts. What is left of that? There are still pockets of hope in the Baltics and the Nordics. Elsewhere, any lingering optimism is fading fast. Poland might have been seen as a counterweight, but the pro-Europe and pro-Ukraine prime minister, Donald Tusk, is struggling.

Spain’s government is teetering, popular fury still strong after the mishandling of the recent floods. Further afield, South Korea has just had its moment of madness with the president’s coup attempt going awry. Japan’s political scene is a mess, with inclusive elections. Even Canada, that beacon of openness to outsiders and to liberalism, is about to turn the other way.

Meanwhile, the populists will feel the wind behind them. Unleashed by Trump, Giorgia Meloni will feel fewer constraints to pursue a more militantly illiberal agenda in Italy. The former communist states of central and Eastern Europe have already moved towards authoritarianism and back into the orbit of the Kremlin. Hungary and Slovakia may later in 2025 be joined by Czechia.

Vladimir Putin is fomenting unrest wherever he can – using far-right and far-left – and with steady success. Having brought Georgia back into his orbit, he narrowly failed to gerrymander elections in Moldova into the hands of a pro-Moscow candidate. A similar attempt in Romania has led to constitutional chaos.

Which leaves who exactly? Step forward the UK, the most unlikely candidate – given its record over the previous decade – as a bastion of stability. Except Sir Keir Starmer, despite his huge parliamentary majority, struggles to leave his mark on an ever-fractured society. The prospect of an ultra-right government, some form of alliance between Reform and the Conservatives, winning the next election, is no longer to be dismissed.

Before sinking into despair, it’s worth considering how France and Germany can drag themselves out of the mire.

Political scientists often fall into the temptation of making sweeping societal analyses. In short: for the wealth divide and lower living standards blame globalisation and the refusal to hold anyone to blame for the financial crash of 2007/8; for the collapse of centre-left politics look no further than “woke”.

Some of that may be true, but often the causes are more prosaic. In the case of France and Germany, it is the failure of leadership.

In France, it was the mercurial arrogance of Emmanuel Macron, “Jupiter” as he is dubbed. Affronted by constant niggling from his opponents, he called parliamentary elections over the summer that backfired spectacularly, producing a three-way split between his centrists, the left and Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally.

The leftist group, which included many former partners in the socialists, made several proposals for prime minister, some of whom could have been accepted. Instead, Macron chose to snub them. His appointment of Michel Barnier, a veteran diplomat and dealmaker, was not, in itself, a controversial one. But in a top-down political system with little in the way of cross-party compromise, Barnier introduced a budget designed to thrust his opponents into a corner rather than to gain consensus.

The German problem is the reverse. There was nothing intrinsically problematic about a three-party coalition. The culture is built around compromise. What failed was the inability of Olaf Scholz to show any spine. With Ukraine, he started spectacularly well, only to go back into his shell. He has not even tried to confront any of the many structural economic weaknesses.

Elections – subject to confirmation by the Bundestag next week – are due on 23 February. Barring a surprise of historic proportions, Scholz should be no more.

Macron and Scholz, the showman and the nitpicker, never got on and it is not hard to understand why. Two very different personalities, two very different constitutions and models of government, both delivering similar disappointment.

Germany’s potential escape route is easier to discern. The new chancellor is almost certain to be Friedrich Merz, leader of the Christian Democrats, a party he has moved back to its traditional Conservative roots and is as far removed as he can be from Angela Merkel’s legacy.

Merz is said to have a “woman problem”. That does not mean any misdemeanour, but more – according to some commentators – an inability to show empathy or engage. As one politician put it to me this week: “Merz has a people problem”. Think a Teutonic mix of Norman Tebbit and Michael Howard. Yet he might be the right person at the right time.

Although he dreams of an outright majority, the voting system will not deliver him that. He will have to work with either the Social Democrats (once they have ditched Scholz) or with the Greens. If he wins big enough, he will be able to dictate the terms of a coalition. Then he can start the herculean task of turning around a hidebound economy by forcing through change.

Macron, meanwhile, is determined to stick around until his term ends in 2027. As he grimaces through the official reopening of Notre-Dame Cathedral today, with Trump as one of the guests of honour, he needs to produce a candidate for prime minister acceptable to a majority in parliament.

That requires a new skill: consensus-building. Germany needs the opposite: more pugilism and a determination to get things done.

The solution is easier to identify than many might think. What is needed in both countries, indeed across those countries that cling to liberal democracy, is better leadership. If that is not found, the door is open for others to walk through.